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Abstract
The role of a labour pension trustee is significant, which makes the recruitment and
selection of labour trustees an important issue. In this paper we examine and
combine aspects of two approaches to recruitment and selection, the political
nomination model and the more professional HRM approach. The political
nomination model is often used by trade unions to elect or appoint trustees. In
contrast, a professional HRM approach emphasizes open recruitment and selection
based on job-related criteria of expertise and continuous learning. We argue that an
integrative approach would acknowledge the political, regulatory and organisational
context while incorporating valid selection criteria such as domain-specific skills and
performance on the job. Such an integrated process can help trade unions in filling
labour trustee positions with talented individuals who are more likely to be effective
in achieving labour’s goals in pension governance.
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Introduction

A discernible world-wide trend towards giving pension plan members greater say in
pension governance has emerged in the last half-century. In the context of
unionized workplaces this has led to more union trustees on pension boards. The
increasing presence of employee representatives on pension boards has attracted
some scrutiny of the role and effectiveness of such representatives. Although
research on this topic is still lacking it has been found that labour (or employee)
representatives on pension boards may not be fully participative members of the
board (Reference withheld 2007; Reference Withheld 2011).

The role of trustees on a pension board is challenging at the best of times; shifting
demographics, turbulent markets, heightened economic pressures on employers and
plan constituents, and movements in support of alternative investment strategies
further complicate challenges facing pension trustees. Labour trustees are not often
experts in pension governance, investment policy, or actuarial science and they must
acquire a degree of functional competence to operate on the board. Moreover, they
experience a heightened political environment due to their actual or perceived union
allegiance. In fulfilling their role, labour trustees must negotiate the tension of their
fiduciary duty to the plan and its constituents and of representing the values or
agenda of their own trade union and perhaps the labour movement more broadly.
Therefore, many trustees experience a degree of both role conflict and role
ambiguity (Rizzo et al 1970). They experience role conflict between their status as a
pension trustee and their status as a union member. They experience role ambiguity
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because there are no clear guidelines as to the responsibilities of pension trustees as
set by pension boards, plan administrators or regulators.

All of the above make the recruitment and selection of the right candidate fraught
with problems. This paper examines two alternate approaches to recruitment and
selection of labour trustees: the nomination approach which is more political in
nature and the more professional human resource management (HRM) approach.
The nomination approach emphasizes the overall political goals of the organization,
in this case the union, and the nominated individuals’ political connections to the
leadership of the union. In contrast, the HRM approach emphasizes development of
a job description backed up by formal job analysis, advertizing the job description
widely to generate a pool of qualified applicants and then a careful selection process
consisting of validated tests and interviews. To HRM professionals any process that
circumvents these essential steps would result in large errors in placement. We
compare and contrast the two alternate approaches to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of each as it applies to placement of labour trustees. We argue that
both models have their strengths and shortcomings and that unions would benefit
from incorporating key elements of the HRM approach into their own nomination
approach. Rather than establish a new dichotomy from which to advocate a
particular set of trustee characteristics that are necessary for fund governance and
performance (i.e., the general prudence versus professionalism debate), we attempt
to synthesize these poles. We suggest that a blended approach to recruitment and
selection could result in labour trustees with more skills in both the political and
professional realms. This would result in greater functional competence, less role
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ambiguity, and more effective participation on the pension board in pursuing
labour’s goals.

Labour Trustees on Pension Boards

In Anglo-Saxon contexts, including Canada, Australia, the US and the UK, there is
some evidence that the composition of pension fund boards have become more
diverse in terms of affiliation, skills and experiences, including cultural and sociodemographic aspects (Clark 2007; Rafferty et al 2008,Reference Withheld). With the
support of trade unions, diversity has increased through greater numbers of plan
members and retirees at the board table as pension trustees (Gribben & Olsen 2002;
Hess 2005; Reference Withheld). Such diversity is often viewed as an important
regulatory mechanism within the corporate governance literature (Tyson 2003).
Diversity and representation can have an enhancing effect on board effectiveness as
it reduces agency costs through monitoring the management’s inherent conflicts of
interests with stakeholders (Daily et al. 2003). As well, Carter et al, (2003: 36)
report a positive relationship between board diversity and firm value among Fortune
1000 firms in the US.

In the Anglo-Saxon model, pension trusteeship is an executive decision-making role
with a high level of legal and moral responsibility (Kakabadse et al 2003). Trustees,
in general, oversee significantly large financial assets1. They also negotiate with
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For example, trusteed pension funds in Canada had assets of $997.8 billion in the third
quarter of 2011 (Statistics Canada 2011). In 2011, Towers Watson, a consulting
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corporate sponsors over funding of occupational pension plans that affect the
pension outcomes of plan members. Moreover, as institutional shareholders, pension
funds exert a dominant role in global financial markets and are influential in shaping
global corporate investment policy. Thus the decision-making process at the board
table also impacts on wider society (Gribben & Grisham 2006).

Given the importance of the trustee role and the diversification of trustees through
increased representation of plan constituents, a debate has arisen regarding the
benefits and risks of so-called ‘lay’ trustees and the skills and education that are
required for trustees to effectively fulfill their fiduciary role. Clark et al. (2006) and
Ambachtsheer et al. (2008) consider that well-intentioned amateurs can complicate
and limit decision-making of pension plans. Clark (2007) claims that the tension
between expertise and representation is increasing as institutions search for
appointees capable of performing well during periods of turbulent financial markets
and crises of underfunded liability such as those experienced by Canada, the US and
the UK over the past decade. Though investment experts also face this uncertainty,
Woods and Urwin (2010:8) claim that they are better able to test and modify their
thinking than other naïve investors. Clark (2007:9) argues that representatives
without advanced quantitative skills, probabilistic reasoning, and numeracy skills are
less competent to adequately monitor the actions of delegated agents and can
become in thrall to powerful legal, financial, and investment experts on how to
behave and act (Clark and Urwin 2010). Evidence cited to support these claims is a
pension trustee experiment which contrasted Oxford graduates with a self-selected
firm, estimated pension assets in the U.S. at $16.08 trillion, in the U.K. at $2.394
trillion and in Canada and Australia at $1.3 trillion (Towers Watson 2012).
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group of pension trustees (Clark et al 2006). It was found that when it came to
strategic investment decision-making the graduates were more consistent than the
pension trustees.

Myners (2001) too was concerned about expertise versus representation. Myners’
response was to suggest that the standard of prudence, common law praxis, be
raised from ‘rational decisions by an ordinary man’ to one where decisions are made
with ‘the skill and care of someone familiar with the issues concerned’. He
acknowledged that it would be unrealistic for all trustees to undergo extensive
training to gain deep expertise, but recommended that trustees should collectively
improve board expertise. Myners (2001: 21) stated that trustees should “…assess
the effectiveness of their own contribution to meeting the objectives of the fund”,
and consider:
• whether the decision-making structures they have in place
address the task of effectively running their fund;
• whether the division of time between their various responsibilities
is right;
• whether they have the right mix of skills and experience
collectively; and
• whether the fund’s control environment is fit for the purpose

This recommendation illustrates that pension boards are responsible for setting their
own standards and uniquely defining the trustee’s roles and responsibilities vis-a-vis
their oversight role. Like Myners, Ambachsheer et al. (2008) also support greater
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professionalism in trusteeship, but emphasize the importance of the internal capacity
of the board to set and maintain standards to achieve strong oversight. Reviews of
corporate board dynamics (Van der Walt et al 2006, Huse 2005) reveal the interrelationships of decision-making where coalitions between others can influence the
decision-making process and board outcomes. Thus, if trustees become too
entangled in financial and investment detail there is a danger that they descend into
micro-management, losing oversight of the broader dynamics of the decision-making
process needed for good pension governance (Ambachtsheer 2007:5).

Ambachtsheer’s more functional approach to pension governance recommended
clarity about the organisation’s purpose through an examination of the boards’ role
and accountability to stakeholders, and to set out management’s role in meeting
board expectations. The trustee has to be able to think strategically, and have skills
or experience in investments, risk management, strategic planning, audit, and HR.
Yet, perhaps more fundamental to this, and all principal-agent scenarios, is the
motivation that trustees are able and willing to use their ‘wisdom, skills and
experience’ to achieve the organisation’s purpose to deliver the organisation’s
pension objectives (Ambachtsheer 2007:5). Central to this notion of motivation is
the sense that the pension trustee is a caretaker of the fund. Boxall and Purcell
indicate that motivation is a ‘fragile’ concept because it is linked to unpredictable
interaction between different parties (2011:26) and in governance this includes
negotiating the different perspectives that stakeholders’ representatives bring to the
pension plan. However, for Ambachtsheer et al (2008) representation is not enough.
Expertise is also needed to counter perceived weaknesses in trustees’ oversight to
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combat potential moral hazard and conflict of interest. Labour trustees are often
asked to ‘leave their union hat at the door’, but in some cases labour representatives
could face the risk that the strengths of common law praxis, such as integrity,
honesty, accountability and independence would be subsumed under the imperatives
of professional management praxis. This could undermine their participation
particularly in private pension plans where, according to a member of Quebec’s
Expert Pension Committee, the board may include ‘management conscripts’ or those
appointed because of their management role and conciliatory relationship to the
employer rather than for their knowledge or competence. Based on our interview
and survey data, this is a particular danger given the tendency for trustees to
delegate decision-making power. This delegation occurs to external advisors such as
fund managers, actuaries, and pension staff, and to pension board sub-committees
(i.e., investment, audit) where there is a tendency to self-select based on perceived
or assumed skills. Such a division of labour undermines the oversight capacity of the
board and has high agency costs.

Leblanc (2004) argued that to understand the black box of corporate governance
one has to focus on board processes and board members’ behaviour, as well as their
skills. As Pye and Pettigrew (2005:31) outline, a specific behavioural act ‘gains
meaning in situations that are located in time.’ In this case, the behavioural
processes behind a board’s attempts to reach consensus are rooted in the structure,
culture, and political power dynamics of the particular pension plan arrangement as
well as the regional, industrial, economic, social and political contexts in which the
organization and the pension plan operate. In this vein, Kakabadse and Kakabadse
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(2005) advocate for the motivation, commitment, and contextual embeddedness
that are often rooted in the experiences of a lay trustee. While they acknowledge
that there may be an advantage to financial expertise, they conclude that “being
well qualified and financially well versed are not perceived determinants of effective
performance for pension fund trustees.” (2005, p. 582) Rather, they emphasize the
importance of wider life and work experiences: open-mindedness, willingness to
learn, ability to listen and work with colleagues, and knowing how to access internal
and independent expertise when needed.

In the face of this debate, Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2005:570) claimed that the
focus should not be on polarity between prudence and professionalism or expertise
and representation, but on how HRM involvement could help enhance trustee
performance and effectiveness through recruitment and selection. Tyson (2003: 9)
made a similar recommendation for the selection and development of non-executive
directors. She advocated for standard HRM practices that could be employed to elicit
a broad pool of applicants for non-executive director roles while simultaneously
meeting the dual criteria of representation (diversity) and competence.

The present paper addresses this call as it explores the value and implications of a
HRM-based recruitment and selection approach for union pension trustees in
addition to the political nomination method. It argues that an integrated approach
would result in a process that sidesteps the professionalism and prudence debate by
creating a system that attracts a broader pool of candidates, where the values of
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both prudence and professionalism can co-exist in a chosen candidate rather than
favour one over the other.

Methodology
To reveal the political as well as practical experiences of nomination, appointment
and election to the labour trustee role, we revisit three sources of previously
collected data (Reference Withheld, 2007, 2008, Reference Withheld2011;Reference
Withheld, 2011). Data sources include: semi-structured interviews with fourteen
policy-makers and experienced pension trustees including six labour trustees in two
Canadian provinces in 2008; twenty semi-structured interviews conducted in 2004
with Canadian labour trustees; and a survey of 116 Canadian labour trustees
conducted in 2005.

We examine this data with a mixed method approach (Brannen, 2005; Tashakkori &
Teddlie, 2010) that allows us to assess complementary (Greene et al 1989)
experiences with both the political and human resource management approaches to
recruitment and selection.

It is important here to note the applicability of research in the Canadian context to
the legislative, political and economic realities of other Anglo-Saxon countries. The
Canadian trend toward greater union involvement in pension trusteeship mirror
those in countries such as the US, UK and Australia, though the specific legislative
context that allows for member representation may vary somewhat across
jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions such as the province of Quebec in Canada,
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legislation stipulates that pension boards have at least one active representative
from the pension fund constituency and one retiree member. In other provincial
jurisdictions in Canada, the number of member trustees and their means of
appointment vary and range from sole labour trusteeship (e.g., in the private sector
building trades) through joint-trusteeship, with equal number of employer and
employee seats, to boards with only one labour representative (Reference
Withheld2007). Similar trends exist in other countries. In the UK one-third of pension
trustees have to be elected members of the plan, and private sector Taft-Hartley
plans in the US must have equal numbers of employer and union selected trustees.
Public occupational pension plans traditionally have more politically nominated
appointments to boards, this means that this Canadian case study shares resonance
with US and UK pension contexts where fund governance is organized around the
conventions of traditional Anglo-Saxon trust model and fiduciary responsibilities
(Clark 2007:6).

The Political Nomination Approach
We found an element of political nomination in all cases of labour trustees’
recruitment and selection. Generally, labour trustees are recruited by the union. The
union executive approaches specific individuals or makes general calls to their
internal staff/executive or the rank and file membership. Following this ‘nomination’
potential labour trustees might run for election, be appointed straightaway by the
union, or be recommended to the employer/government involved in the plan for
appointment. As such, individual union members become involved in pension
trusteeship by coming to the attention of their union executive or union staff
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through self-selection, union activism/involvement in pension matters, or general
union activism/involvement. In rare cases the union may choose to appoint external
representatives who tend to be from the financial or business community, or have
some particular expertise in pension matters (i.e., Teachers’ Pension Plan, Canada
Post Pension Plan).

One strength of the political nomination approach is its compatibility with the
process used to fill other union jobs. Through their union activities trustees have
gained abilities in leadership, consensus building, public speaking, and critical
analysis that facilitate their effectiveness in representing their constituents on the
pension board. As Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2005) argue, these are the key
characteristics of the ‘lay trustee’ that is so central to principles of prudence. Many
labour trustees also cite the importance of a strong ‘union world view’ or labour
perspective so that the labour voice in the boardroom is distinguishable. Recruiting
and selecting candidates based on past union involvement and activism would
ensure a strong grounding in this regard. This is reinforced given that unions are
relatively lax in the guidelines they give to their labour trustees (Reference
Withheld2008) and the covert and overt co-option to traditional governance and
investment perspectives that occurs at the board and at industry events.

However, there are several weaknesses in this approach. The competency and
legitimacy of labour trustees can be, and often is, questioned by important others in
the pension industry. When regarded as the lay person, labour trustees may be seen

12

by pension staff, industry fund managers, and other board members as less expert
(Ambachtsheer et al 2008;).

A second weakness is that a political nomination approach operates within existing
power structures. In our labour trustee survey, only three percent self-selected (i.e.,
they were not approached by the union). Unions are political actors; recruitment and
selection models that recreate existing institutional norms and power dynamics are
problematic. Speaking of similar Anglo-Saxon contexts, Kakabadse and Kakabadse
(2005) and Kang et al. (2007) claim that a board functions better where there are a
variety of perspectives and experiences; however, boards also have to consider the
functional areas of benefits, administration, governance, and investment issues in
their decision-making. So, although direct evidence is not available, we speculate
that the nomination approach could exclude people who could be very effective in
the trustee role. Similarly, it is likely that many nominated individuals who might be
effective as union leaders may prove to be ineffective in the pension trustee role.

A final weakness is the cycle of a democratic election process where job incumbents
must stand for re-election at regular intervals. In the political context of a union it is
important to maintain these democratic principles because the union is the voice of
the membership and all major decisions are ratified at the grassroots level. In the
context of pension trusteeship, where the learning curve is steep and the oversight
requires a long-term perspective, short board tenure is a disadvantage.

The Human Resource Management Approach
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Open recruitment and selection based on valid criteria are integral to HRM models,
alongside training and development, performance management and compensation
(Storey 2007). While there is a debate about the different models of HRM, all stress
the systematic process of recruitment and selection to ensure strategic or cultural fit
(Boxall & Purcell 2011, Legge 1995). In this case it means ensuring fit with pension
board strategy, culture and norms as well as the collective constituency of the
pension board, which includes employer/employee representatives (Guest 1987).

In HRM models (Figure 1), the recruitment and selection process normally involves
writing a job advertisement based on the job analysis and job description of the
vacant position, posting this widely to attract a large pool of applicants, and then
using validated tests and interviews to identify the best candidate who is then
offered an adequate compensation package and inducted into the organisation (Cipd
2009). This HRM model emerges from the accumulation of research evidence and
practical knowledge over several decades (See Taylor 2010 and Catano et al. 2010
for a comprehensive description of the HRM recruitment and selection process). A
formal job analysis ensures a clear understanding of the knowledge, skills, and
abilities required in the job. This is communicated to the applicants through an
accurate job description that also acts to align the role with other jobs within the
organization. Posting the job description in appropriate places ensures that all
persons qualified for the job have the opportunity to consider applying. The larger
the qualified applicant pool, the greater the likelihood that the position can be filled
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with an excellent employee. Selection using validated tests and interviews also
enhances the likelihood that the chosen candidate would perform well on the job.

Figure 1 here

This HRM approach is now nearly universally applied across organizations. However,
given that it is not practiced in the selection of labour trustees it is important to note
its weaknesses for that context. One weakness lies in the emphasis on functional
and technical competence over any political or organizing skills. A formal job analysis
of the pension trustee job could yield a job description that is devoid of the
organizational needs of a union to develop its future leaders. Such a job description
and the recruitment and selection that follows could be “technically” efficient in
finding a suitable candidate, but it could be sub-optimal for the union in its own
long-term planning for leadership succession.

A second weakness is that a detailed job analysis would be quite onerous for each
pension board, particularly given that most trustees are already pressured by time
and are not compensated well by financial industry standards (Myners 2001;
Weststar & Verma 2008, Ambachtsteer et al 2008). To further complicate matters, it
could be argued that the skills or competencies required for labour trustees differ
from requirements for non-labour trustees. For example, relevant past experience
for labour trustees would include trade union experience as well as work or life
experiences that do not directly relate to pension issues. Similarly competencies
based on activist or alternative investment perspectives (i.e., investing in local
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communities or unionized employers, using proxy voting to punish poor labour
practices, or divesting in socially undesirable industries) might not be expected,
required, or desired for all pension trustees. In practice, then, unions would conduct
their own job analysis of the pension trustee role and arrive at different
qualifications for trustees than the governments’ or employers’ qualifications.
According to Quarter et al (2008: 7) this differentiation in roles is critical due to the
persistent coercion or undermining of ‘lay’ trustees by the technocracy (such as fund
managers) as the industry attempts to retain hegemony over investment practice
and education. For instance, one Canadian fund manager commented:

While many plans are managed professionally, their boards are
sometimes stocked with persons whose principal merit is that they are
members, who have been elected by their fellow employees. While this
is laudably democratic, it does not always produce the quality of
direction and oversight necessary in today’s bewildering world (Report
of the Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce
1998: 6).

Labour trustees argue differently:

We can learn the financial stuff- what labor trustees need to have
is the strong union perspective/world view….There is no real sense
of experts on pension funds – even people with a background in
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the financial stuff (i.e. accounting etc.) will be lacking other skills
essential to running a business (Interviewee T10).

An over-emphasis on certain skills or competencies such as financial acumen in
trusteeship may mean that other crucial aspects such as governance or the benefits
aspect of trusteeship are not fully developed. In selecting among candidates it may
be that the decision becomes more of a competition between the suitability of the
candidate in relation to industry and union perspectives of professionalism than
comparing them to what is actually required in the role.

Discussion: An Integrated Approach for Labour Trustees

As noted above, the political nomination and HRM approaches have unique strengths
and weaknesses in the context of labour trustee recruitment and selection. As it is
unlikely that all unions would completely forgo the political nomination method in
favour of a full-blown HRM approach, in what follows we argue that a blended
approach could add great value to the process. Already, unions such as the Ontario
Public Sector Employees’ Union (OPSEU) have instituted a more detailed HRM
approach to their appointment process for the OPTrust and OMERS pension boards.
For example, the 2011 OPSEU Policy Pensions Manual states:

•

Advertisement and job description are circulated as widely as
possible including the OPSEU website;
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•

Membership responses are submitted to the Membership
Benefits Unit; Short list of candidates is prepared by the Pension
Liaison Committee;

•

Short-listed candidates are interviewed by a three-person panel

•

Panel recommendations are forwarded to the OPSEU Executive
Committee and Executive Board for review and approval;

•

Executive Board appoints Trustees based on assessment and
recommendations…

Job Analysis
A challenge with the political nomination approach is the perception that labour
representatives are just union lackeys or appointed for purely political reasons. Even
a labour trustee comments:

I feel that largely the union wants to pick rank and filers who will
vote the way that they (the union) want and are not expecting
much additional value added beyond that. (T9)

Additionally, our data indicate that many labour trustees receive limited guidelines
from their unions as to their role and have unclear expectations about their purpose
on the board. The question of “what is the job of a labour trustee” may differ for
different unions and different plans, but this can be accounted for in an
individualized job analysis that assesses the required tasks and the knowledge, skills,
and abilities required to carry out those tasks. As much as is required and desired,
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this job analysis would include the tasks and skills required to fulfill any union or
labour mandate. A resulting job description would surely differ depending on
individual trade union perspectives towards pensions and pension involvement, the
structural characteristics of the board and the plan, and board composition. For
example, the skills and experience needed for a labour trustee might be different if
they are the only labour representative at the table, if they are operating in a jointtrusteeship model, if they are one union voice among many other unions, or one
union voice among multiple employers.

Job Description
The job description and job advertisement explicitly state the expectations of the
role as they stem from the job analysis. This acts as a signal to prospective
applicants and serves as a guiding framework for performance in the job. As follows
from the job analysis, any particular characteristics that are valued through the
political nomination model could be codified here. For example, a fundamental
requirement for labour trustees is that they must be capable of recognising union
policy and be able to reflect on this from the perspective of all pension plan
members in order to avoid a conflict of interest. OPSEU’s (2011) job advertisement
explicitly states that its labour trustees need an understanding of the union’s beliefs
and policies as well as the ability to “articulate where workers sit in relation to the
management and investment of capital”. Applicants also must be able to formulate a
pension position from their reading of documentation and research, defend that
positions to high status others, prepare position papers based on “Union
foundations”, and be aware of the time commitments required.
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A statement from a labour trustee and union official confirms many of these
responsibilities and illustrates that social and technical competencies as well as
structural features of the job (i.e., time commitments) could be identified and
formalized in a written job description:

the role requires a very active voice, it is time consuming, but you
do not spend a lot of time negotiating as you delegate; but you
have to know what to delegate and you have to be careful about
monitoring the delegation and you have to be very careful about
being socially responsible and ethical investments; and every so
often you really have to bring in a manager, when things start
going off the rails and stuff; it’s a very active role, it’s pretty tiring
time-wise and energy-wise. (T27)

Such a job description would more accurately portray the demands of the job so that
potential applicants are prepared for the role and recognize its challenges. The
amount of time the job demands is a real concern for labour trustees as the
demands increase (Reference Withheld2008). As well, the job must have a clear and
appropriate compensatory arrangement in order to attract and retain the best
candidates. As noted by one trustee,
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“I think it is very important that trustees are given time off with pay to

travel, and prepare for the meetings. It should not cost an employee
anything to sit as a trustee.” (Interviewee T8)

Most compensatory arrangements for labour trustees are inadequate because
trustees are only reimbursed for the time spent at meetings. Also there is
inconsistency in how trustees are reimbursed with some trustees reporting no
compensation at all (Reference Withheld2008). It is recommended that the sponsors
of pension plans seriously consider the different financial and temporal demands on
their trustees and compensate these demands equitably across all trustee types
(Ambachtsheer 2007). Though equitable compensation systems can exist within a
political nomination approach to recruitment and selection, a formal process that
legitimizes successful union candidates would help to make the case for increased
compensation for their contributions.

Identifying Entry Qualifications
Due to the debate over the knowledge, skills, abilities and/or competencies required
for pension trustees and the centrality of these to the selection and evaluation
process of HRM, it is necessary to expand our discussion at this point.

Pension fund regulators in Canada do not stipulate the skills required of a pension
trustee. As one senior pension administrator noted, a trustee needs to have “the skill

to go out and get knowledge and expertise if required’” and s/he has to have
enough knowledge to assess and monitor that expert knowledge. Within this context
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there is a general recognition that for boards to function effectively their members
need a wide range of skills. These would include specific expertise in law, finance
and management as well as broader capability with respect to problem solving,
facilitating decision-making, the maintenance of effective working relationships,
communicating with the constituency and leadership bodies, working with a group,
and a strong commitment to the role.

In the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan the labour seats are outsourced to
professional trustees selected from the financial industry. In this case, there is a
clear preference for specific professional skills: “Since 1990, the OTF and the Ontario
government have successfully attracted board members with the appropriate
qualifications in investments, finance, accounting, law, actuarial science, business
management and technology to properly oversee management’s decisions and
actions.” (www.otpp.com) The implication of the focus on these skill sets is
immediately apparent in reviewing the biographies; only one of the nine board
members has direct experience as a union member and one other is arguably a
progressive economist who has consulted for trade unions.

In a blended political nomination and HRM approach the entry requirements would
reflect a balance between the mix of experiences gained through specific training in
or exposure to pension governance issues and more general skills typically acquired
through union activity. It is not surprising that previous involvement in union
activities plays a larger part in who gets nominated than expertise in pension
matters. One labour trustee felt that if you are a union activist, ‘that puts you in the
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pool so to speak’ (T11). Another told us that he was ‘concerned about (formal)
evaluation and selection procedures because of the broad knowledge needed [in
trusteeship].’ (T10) He explained that he did not know anything about pensions
when he came to the role, but he had a lot of other skills and knowledge (such as
leadership and union connections) that have made him a good trustee. If the
selection criteria are too rigidly tied to domain-specific skills then these broader
oversight skills could be discounted or go unnoticed.

Within the context of a blended approach, a competency framework would be
useful. Competencies are used to select people who share the beliefs that underpin
an organisation’s culture. Given the complexity of the labour trustee role and the
political context in which it resides, a competency approach would allow trade unions
to incorporate into their selection criteria such broad factors as: traits, motives, selfimage, and one’s social role. It is true that the competency approach is more
complicated and trade unions may not have the resources and inclination to draw up
a meaningful range of competencies (Markus et al 2005; Heinsman et al, 2007).
However, we consider in principle that a competency approach permits unions to
include labour values and attitudes as well as specific functional skill-sets in trustee
selection. Continuous learning and recognition of the integrity of the governance
process could also be included here.

Depending on the competencies or skills identified as required qualifications, we can
begin to see a continuum of potential labour trustee applicants. On the left would be
a political nomination approach which would tend to privilege previous union
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experience. On the right would be a ‘professional’ skills approach that would
privilege those with pension or financial experience. Two blended options exist. First,
unions could employ an HRM approach that focuses on pension aptitude, but is
applied within the ranks of union membership. This approach can sidestep the
politics of the nomination model to some degree, but the specific requirement of
pension aptitude likely narrows the pool of potential applicants to union staff or
executive members who have served on pensions and benefits committees. Rank
and file members with different experience would be discounted or self-select out of
the pool. In practice what happens is:

Labour trustees are normally recruited (by the union) and often include
union staff members because they have more time to devote to the issues,
more expertise generally in pensions and/or union matters, more consistency
of the union message (Interviewee T9).

Though grounding in a union perspective is a benefit for labour trustees, a pool of
individuals already appointed or elected to official union roles may not provide ideal
levels of diversity. Therefore, we would recommend a second HRM approach that
highlights the need for some pension aptitude in conjunction with grounding in the
union worldview and the commitment to learn. This latter approach is the model
employed by OPSEU, who explicitly state a preference for plan members over union
staff (OPSEU, 2011: 6). The preference for plan members also helps to reduce the
distance between the membership and the labour representative and strengthens
the pluralistic assumption upon which representative democracy is based.
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Attracting Qualified Applicants
In the HRM approach it is desirable to recruit as large an applicant pool as possible
to widen choice in selecting the best job candidate. However, as is the case for most
senior executive roles, the numbers of candidates for each pension trustee position
are generally small. For labour trustees, the ultimate constraint is typically the
requirement to be a member of the union and the pension scheme. Given the job
complexity, there are a limited number of rank and file members who would meet
the criteria. Therefore, it is somewhat unavoidable and perhaps desirable to employ
political nomination techniques to identify and encourage potential applicants.
However, the political nature of appointments needs to be acknowledged because it
would be unlikely that the President/ Executive would support the candidature of
someone with whom they fundamentally disagree. Using clear HRM selection
techniques to assess and ultimately select the successful candidate can mitigate
some of the political bias that might result from this system.

Selection Techniques
Unions have limited resources and for many the issue of pension governance is not a
priority. The political nomination method (either appointment or election) is useful
because it employs systems already in place within the union structure and does not
add significant administrative burden. HRM selection approaches should aim to be as
effective as possible while balancing simplicity, time and cost (see Schwind et al
2007); however, even the simplest techniques such as application letters where
individuals outline their motivation, experience and skills, written tests about

25

governance, or interviews to probe whether the candidates grasps the intricacies of
the role will require additional bureaucracy for the union. Therefore, the priority for a
blended approach should be to employ a transparent and fair process that values a
range of skills and past experiences without discouraging applicants due to overly
onerous or intimidating selection processes or the impression of jumping through
hoops.

Our data suggest that labour trustees face a very high demand on their time, a very
steep learning curve, required to read considerable amounts of material at short
notice, covert and overt disinclination of other board members to answer questions,
and the general feeling of being on the outside of Board proceedings. These findings
suggest that the process could benefit from some form of realistic job preview. Each
applicant could easily have an informational meeting with current or outgoing
trustees. A type of ‘trustee in training’ system could increase the pool of qualified
applicants and permit interested individuals to attend pension training and engage in
discussions with trustees, before they even apply for the job. This would form a pool
of previously self-identified ‘trainees’ for recruitment and selection and also serve an
important general education function. To help fulfill the political or representational
mandate, this could also be a fertile ground for discussions and guidance about
labour’s specific role in pension trusteeship.

Induction into the Job
Unlike an HRM approach, in a political nomination model there is no explicit
provision for job orientation or socialization. Labour trustees face a steep learning
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curve and the potential for exclusion at the board table. An HRM approach that
encouraged unions to provide on-going training and access to wider support
networks comprised of experts and other labour trustees could better prepare
trustees for the upward battle of gaining legitimacy at the board and equip them
with the necessary arguments for a stakeholder perspective of pension governance
(Carmichael et al 2003). Existing examples of such support are the trustee education
initiatives of the Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec (FTQ) and the
Shareholder Association for Research and Education (SHARE). According to a labour
trustee and pension specialist, the FTQ plays a crucial role in supporting lay trustees:

We do have pressure from others in Canada that [pension trustees]
shouldn’t be union members they should be specialists, because the
union members don’t have the knowledge or the time to do the job
right. And we at FTQ are saying it is possible, we have been doing it
for many years… We actually think our trustees are better than
employer nominated trustees because they choose to be there. (T24)

An HRM approach to job incumbency based on job performance and continuous
learning also reflects the need to invest in the development of labour trustees and
not force trustees from their role if only to comply with democratic principles of
unionism that perhaps do not fit this unique role.

Summary of A Blended Model
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Based on the above discussions, we have attempted to dichotomize particular
recruitment and selection behaviours into an HRM and political nomination approach
(see Table 1). Our argument is that unions would do well to consider recruitment
and selection from both approaches based on their own ideologies and realities for
labour involvement in pension governance. This integration would overcome some of
the key weaknesses of both the political nomination and human resources model. In
sum, the HRM approach could bring more transparency and accountability to the
recruitment and selection process. This fits with the ideals of pension governance.
An HRM approach does not eliminate all political elements of the recruitment and
selection process. Unions have to design their processes to specifically acknowledge
that selection can be a “political exercise that involves different levels of influence
and power between power networks of various collaborations, cliques and coalitions”
and which act to favour candidates who will help advance the vested interests of
these groups (Bozionelos 2005:1607). In this way, the HRM model adds legitimacy
to labour trustees as they engage in a more competitive process that involves
considerations of relevant skills or competencies.

The importance of broad-based experiences rooted in the lives of working people,
activism, and trade union activities are often discounted in formal credential-based
systems (Livingstone & Sawchuk, 2004). The political nomination approach permits
these traditional values to be considered and recognizes the power dynamics at work
in the pension board context. Relationships between the executive members are
more influential in the decision-making process than notions of comparative
expertise. As a former trade union policy maker and pension expert notes:
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Trustees need to recognise that a lot of the key decisions you end up
making regardless of whether you’re in a so-called expert
environment or a representative environment include making key
value judgments [and] are not frankly matters of expertise. As you
get to the point of a decision-making process on boards personal
interactions becomes incredibly important to the decision making
process and there is no expert financial aspect to these things. (T
22)

The executive nature of decision-making on pension boards is a core activity and
skill, but this decision-making has a behavioural, political dimension that is linked to
the power and status of the individuals involved and the organisational context in
which it operates. Political behaviour is an important feature of trade union activities
that influences organisational processes such as recruitment (Treadway et al 2005).
Political savvy gained from years of union activism cannot be discounted. As such,
the intention is for trade unions to first analyse the trustee role from an HRM
perspective and then move to incorporate political aspects that are fundamental to
them as an organisation.

Table 1 here

Conclusion
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This paper concludes that the recruitment process for labour trustees needs to
acknowledge the political, regulatory and organisational contexts in which pension
trustees operate in order to attract and retain talented individuals. It also needs to
consider the emphasis that different trade unions place on pension governance and
supporting labour trustees in performing their fiduciary duties. In this regard, neither
the professional HRM approach nor the political nomination approach as it is
currently practiced is likely to yield the best outcomes for unions and their members.
A different approach that integrates some of the strengths of both approaches is
more likely to help unions place effective trustees on pension boards. An integrated
model of recruitment and selection would also need to acknowledge the dynamics of
differing political imperatives of both private and public institutions, which can
impact on the process by which labour trustees are selected/appointed/elected
(Calvert 2005). The model could also be extended to employer trustee
representatives enhance selections. This would help address how some employer
trustees are not picked for the skills they can bring to trusteeship but more because
of the position they occupy within the sponsoring organization.

Our analysis suggests that effective labour trustees need to be able to respond to
the concerns of the labour community while simultaneously maintaining the fiduciary
rigour required by law to protect the plan and its constituents. At the heart of these
assertions is the need for labour bodies to be explicit about their strategic goals in
pension governance. Without this focus on long-term goals, trade unions would be
unable to articulate the role of the labour trustee (i.e., conduct job analysis) and
unions would find it difficult to develop their own talent in this area. Unless better
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recruitment and selection processes are put in place, effective labour voice in
pension governance will remain elusive.

The similarity of Anglo-Saxon pension trust frameworks and fiduciary responsibilities
in North America, the UK and Australia (Clark 2007, Hess 2005, Kang et al 2007)
indicates that the integrated model has relevance outside of the Canadian context.
In recognizing the political context in which nomination occurs in public and private
institutions and in strengthening recruitment and selection of appointed
representatives in line with a HRM approach it can help improve the legitimacy of
candidates who represent the membership as well as improve governance.
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Table 1: Considerations for the Recruitment and Selection of Labour
Trustees
HRM Model
Job analysis

•

•

Political
Nomination
Model

Integrated Model

Outline the integrity of
the governance process
and the potential for
conflict;
Consider compensation:
temporal and financial
aspects
Specific expertise
needed (i.e., legal,
financial, leadership,
personal development,
open-mindedness,
communication, coalition
maintenance, analytical
skills)

•

Recognise what
type of labour
trustee is required
for the pension
plan model

•

Outline goals and
expectations of
labour trustees from
a labour/trade union
perspective

•

Union experience
and sensibility
Organising skills

•

Ability to articulate
and defend skills
and views to other
executives and
important others in
boardroom context

Personal
identification of
potential
candidates from
small pool by
senior union
members
Verify candidates’
ability to recognize
labour perspective

•

Widen the candidate
pool through: a
trustee-in-training
system, pension
training, contact /
mentoring with
existing trustees
Outline a wide
range of required
skills & experiences
Use a transparent
and fair assessment
process without
being overly
complicated
Balance the need
for both specific and
broad skills with
union activism and
the collective
pension board
constituency
Consider diversity of
pension education
as well as available
social networks in
supporting trustee
development

Job
description
Person
specification

•

Attracting
candidates

•

Publicise to the
membership and invite
independent applications

•

Selecting
Candidates

•

Validated tests and
interviews to check
candidates’ skills,
motivation and
commitment to
trusteeship

•

Match candidate to job
specification
Complement existing
composition of pension
board skills

•

Match prevailing
labour values and
attitudes with the
candidate

•

Outline fiduciary /
regulatory requirements
Offer training regarding
planning, governance,
finance and welfare as
well as the pension plan
context

•

Support /offer
training with a
strategic/political
labour perspective
Build networks
with other labour
trustees

•

Making the
appointment

•

Induction

•

•

•

•

•

•
•

